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GENDERED SPACE AND THE REASONABLENESS
STANDARD IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
TERESA GODWIN PHELPS*
From the momentous judicial recognition that sexual har-
assment in the workplace was not a "personal urge"' or an
"inharmonious personal relationship"2 but rather employment
discrimination violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, courts have struggled with the problem of perspective, par-
ticularly in hostile environment cases. Through whose eyes
should workplace conditions be seen and evaluated? Who is the
even more elusive "reasonable person," for whom the working
environment becomes so uncomfortable that the ability to do
one's job is undermined to the extent that illegal sexual discrimi-
nation has occurred? If different workers have differing interpre-
tations of workplace conduct, whose interpretation should
prevail? With each new court-created standard-welcomeness,'
severe or pervasive,4 alter the conditions of employment,5 abu-
sive working environment,6 totality of the (workplace) circum-
stancesY-a troubling question arises: according to whom? The
Sixth Circuit has suggested that the workplace behavior and envi-
ronment be measured according to the average reasonable per-
son who typically works in that particular work environment,' the
Ninth Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court have created a
reasonable woman standard,9 the Third Circuit requires "[a] rea-
sonable person of the same sex in that position,"' and the
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. The author wishes to thank
Lucy Payne for her valuable research assistance and William Krier for his
insightful editorial comments.
1. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
2. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 123 (D.D.C. Aug.
9, 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
3. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
4. See id. at 67.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
8. See id.
9. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Lehmann v.
Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 453-54 (N.J. 1993).
10. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Supreme Court thus far has mentioned only a "reasonable
person.""
The question according to whom is not a trivial one. Socio-
logical and psychological studies show that women and men
experience workplace behavior differendy:' 2 remarks and behav-
ior that are offensive, demeaning, and threatening to women are
often harmless jokes and even compliments to men. In fact, one
judge has suggested that "[u] se of vulgar and obscene language"
actually builds workplace morale.' 3 What is clear is that the dis-
criminatory impact of workplace behavior is contingent on per-
sonal perspective: what is "reasonable" to one person is
"unreasonable" to another. It is not surprising, then, that courts
are on uncertain ground in attempting to develop a standard of
reasonableness that is fair and that takes into account varying
perspectives.
14
Beyond perspective, though, and intertwined with it, is
space. What is inoffensive to a person in one place is offensive in
another place. Why is it that certain conduct is merely rude or
insensitive in some places, but is discriminatory in the workplace?
What difference can be articulated by and for courts as they
struggle to define the legitimate task of the law-not to police
manners and social mores, but to enforce measures that prevent
the kind of discrimination targeted by Congress in its enactment
of Title VII?
This article attempts to provide that articulation and
introduces a new concept into the consideration of the reasona-
bleness standard in hostile environment sexual harassment cases:
that of gendered space. Gendered space can help us (and the
courts) understand the workplace in a new way and come to a
11. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1507 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1202 (1989);
Katherine A. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv.
691, 745-46 (1997).
13. See Lewd Talk Can Boost Morale, Says Judge in Ruling Against Woman,
CHI. TaRB., Sept. 26, 1997, at 12.
14. In her excellent critique of Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Nancy
Ehrenreich argues that the reasonableness standard in hostile environment
sexual harassment cases ought to be abandoned entirely in that
"[r]easonableness in legal ideology is simply too closely tied to the idea of
objectivity-to the notion that the law can resolve legal conflicts without
reflecting or reinforcing any personal perspective." Nancy S. Ehrenreich,
Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1232 (1990). While I find her argument
perceptive, I am not optimistic that courts are close to this abdication of
reasonableness and prefer to press toward a better understanding of it.
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better conception of how particular workplace behavior may or
may not violate the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I first review the development of
sexual harassment law that led to the perspective problem. I
then discuss the concept of space as gendered space, and finally
apply it to the most troubling cases involving perspective. In so
doing, I am attempting to identify why sexual harassment in the
workplace belongs under a law prohibiting discrimination, a
nexus that is becoming increasingly unclear as the hostile envi-
ronment cases develop with a dizzying variety of plaintiffs,
defendants, and conduct.15 By incorporating the insight that dis-
crimination occurs because the space is gendered, I hope to
avoid the "women are more sensitive" special category trap to
which the perspective problem often leads.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND THE PERSPECTIVE PROBLEM
Until the mid-1970s, people who experienced sexual harass-
ment in the workplace had little legal recourse.16 The behavior
we have now named sexual harassment occurred, 17 of course, but
the victims either "consented," tried to ignore the behavior, or
quit their jobs. Whatever coping mechanism they chose, many
workers experienced emotional, physical, and psychological
stress, as well as "lower productivity, reduced self-confidence, and
15. During this Term, the Supreme Court has decided one sexual
harassment case and has granted certiorari in three others. See Oncale v.
Sundowner Off-Shore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding same-sex
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998), granting cert. tojansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am.,
123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (employer's strict liability for supervisory quid pro
quo harassment); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), granting
cert. to 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.) (employer vicarious liability in a Title VII
hostile environment claim); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct.
1206 (1997), reviewing Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th
Cir.) (employer vicarious liability in a Title IX claim).
16. One could have brought an action in tort, such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress or assault, see Lucinda Finley, A Break in the
Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 55
(1989) (providing a short list of cases in which victims of sexual harassment
found relief through tort law), contract, see Monge v. Beebe Rubber, 316 A.2d
549, 551-52 (N.H. 1974), or employment law. Forcible rape in the workplace
would, of course, come under the criminal justice system. Prior to the early
1970s, however, such cases were very rare.
17. Catharine MacKinnon's groundbreaking book on sexual harassment,
SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
(1979), cites numerous studies and statistics to demonstrate how commonplace
sexual harassment in the workplace has been. See id. at 25-55; see also Barbara
Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'v 335, 344 (1992).
1998]
268 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
a loss of motivation and commitment to their work and their
employer."'" Many workers, women in particular, failed to expe-
rience the workplace equality promised by legal developments
such as the Equal Pay Act 19 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196420 because conditions in the workplace presented them with
barriers to competing with their male coworkers on an equal
basis. Thus, sexual harassment is more than mistreatment, more
than boorish behavior on the part of men; it is discrimination
based on sex that affects the "terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment,"21 and as such violates the law.
The judicial recognition of the discriminatory harm of sex-
ual harassment occurred in incremental stages. In 1976, a fed-
eral district court in a review of an administrative agency's refusal
to consider sexual harassment under Title VII,22 first ruled that
sexual harassment in the form of overt sexual requests consti-
tuted sex discrimination. The agency had found no "causal rela-
tionship" between Diane Williams' rejection of her supervisor's
advances and her ultimate termination 23 and argued that the
Tide VII claim was vitiated because "carnal demands" could be
made of both men and women. 24 The reviewing court saw the
situation differently and ruled that "the conduct of the plaintiffs
supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment which was
placed before one gender and not the other, despite the fact that
both genders were similarly situated. '25 In 1977, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a lower
court decision granting a summaryjudgment to the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, in which a woman claimed that the
Agency had violated Title VII because she had lost herjob due to
sexual harassment. The district court ruled that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act did not cover Paulette Barnes' complaint that her
job was abolished at the Agency because she had turned down
her superior's sexual advances, reasoning:
The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was
discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but
because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her
supervisor. This is a controversy underpinned by the sub-
18. Gutek, supra note 17, at 349.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
21. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
22. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
23. Id. at 656.
24. Id. at 657.
25. Id. at 657-58.
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tleties of an inharmonious personal relationship. Regard-
less of how inexcusable the conduct of plaintiffs supervisor
might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier
to continued employment based on plaintiffs sex.
26
The appellate court disagreed and instead saw that Barnes lost
her job because of her sex: that "retention of [Barnes'] job was
conditioned upon submission to sexual relations-an exaction
which the supervisor would not have sought from any male."2 7
Paulette Barnes' complaint captured a classic quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment situation: her sexual acquiescence for her job.
In subsequent cases, courts also recognized another kind of
sexual harassment-hostile environment-in which one's job
might not depend explicitly on the granting of sexual favors, but
that the workplace itself was so permeated by sexual innuendo
and insults that one's job performance was affected: "where an
employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory
work environment, regardless of whether the complaining employ-
ees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the
discrimination. "28
In 1986 the Supreme Court gave its stamp of approval to
these developments, recognizing both the cognizability of sexual
harassment under Tire VII and the two types of sexual harass-
ment, quid pro quo and hostile environment. In Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,29 the Court found that although Mechelle Vinson
had seemingly "consented" to sexual relations with her supervi-
sor, Sidney Taylor, "the fact that sex-related conduct was 'volun-
tary,' in the sense that the complainant was not forced to
participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harass-
ment suit brought under Title VII." ° The Court established that
"the correct inquiry is whether [Vinson] by her conduct indi-
cated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome."3 1 As
encouraging as the Court's opinion was in its official recognition
of the discriminatory nature (and hence illegality) of sexual har-
assment, its position on welcomeness was troubling. One would
think that whether conduct was welcome would depend upon
the perspective of the person doing the welcoming or not.
Instead, the Court shifted the point of view, in large part, to the
alleged harasser's perspective. The proper inquiry became not
26. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 123 (D.D.C. Aug.
9, 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
27. Costle, 561 F.2d at 989 (footnote omitted).
28. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
30. Id. at 68.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
1998]
270 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
did Mechelle Vinson welcome Sidney Taylor's advances, but did
Sidney Taylor think that Mechelle Vinson welcomed his
advances. The Court came close to equating Vinson's choice of
what to wear to work to whether she welcomed sexual advances,
that her choice of apparel was a legally recognized signal of her
receptiveness to sexual advances: "[w]hile 'voluntariness' in the
sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not
follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress
is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she
found particular sexual advances unwelcome."32
In determining what conditions would constitute an actiona-
ble hostile environment, the Court used racial hostile environ-
ment cases as the analogue33 and established that for sexual
harassment to violate Title VII, the conduct "must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."'' 4
The Court thereby set up four additional standards: severe, per-
vasive, altering the conditions of employment, and creating an
abusive working environment. Once more, the perspective prob-
lem arises: according to whom? If welcomeness can shift from
the alleged victim to the alleged harasser, then a determination
of whether conduct is severe, pervasive, transforming, and abu-
sive can likewise shift. Additionally, since each of these elements
requires some sort of measurement of emotional response, the
perspective is necessarily subjective, whether the viewing subject
is victim, harasser, or a judge.
The same year, 1986, the Sixth Circuit further weakened the
victim's perspective as the point of view from which the new stan-
dards might be judged in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.35
Vivienne Rabidue, despite being the only woman in a managerial
position at Osceola Refining Company,3 6 was described by the
court as "abrasive, rude, antagonistic, extremely willful, uncoop-
erative, and irascible."3 " Rabidue had had an "unfortunate acri-
monious working relationship"" with a co-worker, Douglas
Henry, whom the court described as "an extremely vulgar and
32. Id. at 69.
33. See id. at 65 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)).
Also cited were Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977), Firefighters Institute for
Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977) and Gray v. Greyhound
Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
34. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
35. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
36. See id. at 623.
37. Id. at 615.
38. Id.
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crude individual who customarily made obscene comments
about women generally, and, on occasion, directed such obscen-
ities to the plaintiff." 9 When Rabidue was discharged from her
job, she filed a complaint charging hostile environment sex dis-
crimination and sexual harassment.
The court, using in part the guidelines issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), required that
"the sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with the plaintiff's work performance and creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment that affected
seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being of the plaintiff."4"
And the court went on to address the perspective problem:
To accord appropriate protection to both plaintiffs and
defendants in a hostile and/or abusive work environment
sexual harassment case, the trier of fact, when judging the
totality of the circumstances impacting upon the asserted
abusive and hostile environment placed in issue by the
plaintiff's charges, must adopt the perspective of a reason-
able person's reaction to a similar environment under essen-
tially like or similar circumstances.41
The court included among the factors to be considered in judg-
ing the totality of the circumstances in such a case "the lexicon of
obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both
before and after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs,
coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon vol-
untarily entering that environment."42 Thus, the context in
which Henry's obscenities, as well as the "displayed pictures of
nude or scantily clad women"43 to which the female workers were
exposed, were to be judged was the typical, male-dominated
refinery work environment and "a society that condones and pub-
licly features and commercially exploits open displays of written
and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television,
at the cinema, and in other public places."' Let the female
worker beware. If she chooses to work in a refinery (or the like),
she better be thick-skinned or "rough hewn and vulgar"
45
enough to withstand the Douglas Henrys of the world. That was
the "reasonable" perspective in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit. So,
39. Id.
40. Id. at 619.
41. Id. at 620. (emphasis added).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 615.
44. Id. at 622.
45. Id. at 620.
19981
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although Henry's obscenities were "annoying,"46 his "vulgar lan-
guage, coupled with the sexually oriented posters, did not result
in a working environment that could be considered intimidating,
hostile, or offensive."47 The court essentially ignored, or col-
lapsed, the concept of space: the workplace was of a piece with
the larger world and conditions in the workplace would be mea-
sured according to the standards in that world.4s
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit took a decidedly different
tack in Ellison v. Brady.49 Kerry Ellison and Sterling Gray were co-
workers at the Internal Revenue Service office in San Mateo, Cal-
ifornia. Gray apparently became infatuated with Ellison and
began leaving her notes which said things like "I cried over you
last night and I'm totally drained today" and "I have enjoyed you
so much over these past few months. Watching you. Experienc-
ing you from 0 so far away."50 Ellison complained to her superi-
ors and eventually Gray was transferred to the San Francisco
office. After three weeks, Gray filed a union grievance that
resulted in his return to San Mateo, and in his writing another
strange letter to Ellison. Ellison filed a complaint in federal dis-
trict court alleging hostile environment sexual harassment; the
court granted the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment on
the ground that Ellison failed to state a prima facie case.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and departed from the standards
set forth in Rabidue. The court acknowledged that Ellison and
Gray had different perspectives, that while Gray might describe
his behavior as courtship and that while an outside observer
might describe the incidents as trivial, the appropriate inquiry
for a court was Ellison's perspective:
We therefore prefer to analyze harassment from the
victim's perspective. A complete understanding of the vic-
tim's view requires, among other things, an analysis of the
different perspectives of men and women. Conduct that
many men consider unobjectionable may offend many
women....
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman pri-
marily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable per-
46. Id. at 622.
47. Id.
48. Everyone does not agree with the Sixth Circuit that pornography is so
widely accepted and condoned in the larger world. See Abrams, supra note 12,
at 1199-1202; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS passim (1993).
49. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
50. Id. at 874.
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son standard tends to be male-based and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women. 1
However enlightened the Ninth Circuit's words may appear,
the reasonable woman standard raises considerable problems. It
comes close to reifying a single standard called Woman that has
been long used to prevent women from entering the working
world, 2 and it suggests that all women are more sensitive, espe-
cially when it comes to sex-related matters, than all men. An
atypical woman, such as Vivienne Rabidue, might not fit into the
court's conception of a "reasonable woman," and her claim
might fail.
In a case with a work environment similar to that described
in Rabidue, a district court took a less sympathetic view of the
status quo of a male-dominated workplace. In Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc.," Lois Robinson centered her claim of hostile
environment sexual harassment on pictures of nude and scantily
clad women, some in sexually provocative poses, and sexually
suggestive and demeaning remarks in the workplace. In its Find-
ings of Fact, the court described the Jacksonville Shipyards (JSI)
working environment in the following way:
JSI is, in the words of its employees, "a boys club," and
"more or less a man's world." Women craftworkers are an
extreme rarity. The company's EEO-1 reports from 1980
to 1987 typically show that women form less than 5 percent
of the skilled crafts. For example, JSI reported employing
2 women and 958 men as skilled craftworkers in 1980, 7
women and 1,010 men as skilled craftworkers in 1983, and
6 women and 846 men as skilled craftworkers in 1986....
JSI has never employed a woman as a leaderman, quarter-
man, assistant foreman, foreman, superintendent, or coor-
dinator. Nor has any woman ever held a position of Vice-
President or President of JSI.
54
At trial, each of three women testified that when she was sexually
harassed, she was the only woman in a group of men.55 The
court's findings continue for pages (items a through t) describ-
ing in detail the "visual assault on the sensibilities of female work-
51. Id. at 878-79 (citations omitted).
52. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a statute
prohibiting women from engaging in the trade of bartending); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a statute prescribing maximum hours
of labor for women); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)
(upholding a statute refusing to grant women the right to practice law).
53. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
54. Id. at 1493 (citations omitted).
55. See id.
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ers at JSI that did not relent during working hours."5 6 The
remarks directed at Robinson and others were both sexual ("The
more you lick it the harder it gets"'5 7) and insulting to women
("there's nothing worse than having to work around women" 8 ).
When Robinson challenged one of the men, she was told that he
was not harassing her because he had not propositioned her.
When her complaints became widely known, a "Men Only" sign
was attached to the door of the shipfitters' trailer, the general
harassment escalated, and when Robinson formally complained,
her superior responded that the shipyards were a "man's
world.""
In finding that the work environment was hostile, the court
evaluated the extensive expert testimony regarding reasonable
responses to the JSI workplace offered by both sides. The court
favorably quoted the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert on
stereotyping, who testified for the plaintiff that sexual stereotyp-
ing such as that found atJSI results in the evaluation of the suita-
bility of women as a group:
In practice, this translates into a perception that women
are more similar to other women and more different from
men (and vice versa) than they actually may be. This
perceptual process produces the in-group/out-group phe-
nomenon: members of the other group or groups are
viewed less favorably., This categorizing process can pro-
duce discriminatory results in employment settings if it
leads a person in that job setting to judge another person
based on some quality unrelated to job performance into
which the other person falls.60
Dr. Fiske also maintained that one of the major preconditions for
stereotyping is rarity: stereotyping of women is much more likely
to occur if there are relatively few women in a workplace. Sexu-
ally suggestive pictures of women lead to a mindset that stereo-
types women as sex objects, which in turn leads to behavior that
judges and treats women as unfit for a particular workplace.
Fiske's testimony on the negative impact of sex stereotyping
in the workplace was buttressed by the testimony of KC. Wagner,
an expert on women in nontraditional employment settings,
which the court also cited with approval. Wagner testified that
"women in nontraditional employment who form a small minor-
56. Id. at 1495.
57. Id. at 1498.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1515.
60. Id. at 1502.
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ity of the workforce are at particular risk of suffering male worker
behaviors such as sexual teasing, sexual joking, and the display of
materials of a sexual nature."61
The court was not favorably inclined toward the defendant's
experts who testified that sexually explicit materials did not
bother most women because the experts' studies dealt with expo-
sure to these materials in contexts other than the work environ-
ment at JSI: "The important element of context is missing; the
sexually harassing impact of the materials must be measured in
the circumstances of the JSI work environment."62 The court
also, unlike the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue, was unimpressed with
JSI's evidence concerning conditions in other shipyards, in part
because the percentage of women was much higher in their
workforces. The court determined that the severity and perva-
siveness of sexually harassing behavior must be judged using a
"holistic perspective," including "the salient conditions of the
work environment, such as the rarity of women in the relevant
work areas."63 The court found that "[a] reasonable woman
would find that the working environment atJSI was abusive," and
"that the cumulative, corrosive effect of this work environment
over time affects the psychological well-being of a reasonable
woman placed in these conditions."64 The court saw the JSI
workplace as separate and different from the world at large.
As part of its remedy, the court rejected JSI's First Amend-
ment arguments and issued an injunction that prohibited both
the displaying and the reading of sexually suggestive or discrimi-
natory material in the JSI workplace. The court also ordered
educational programs and monitoring of the JSI workplace to
change the behavior of the male workers.65
Each of these latter three cases has met with intense criti-
cism. Rabidue has been roundly repudiated by both courts and
scholars for several reasons: first, because its reasonableness
standard is tied to and reinforces a status quo that is largely anti-
woman and "privileges one narrow, elite viewpoint and silences
others;"6 6 second, because "by applying the prevailing workplace
factor, [the] court locks the vast majority of working women into
61. Id. at 1506.
62. Id. at 1509.
63. Id. at 1524.
64. Id. at 1524-25.
65. See id. at 1545-46.
66. Ehrenreich, supra note 14, at 1207; see also Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Obscene language and
pornography quite possibly could be regarded as highly offensive to a woman
who seeks to deal with her fellow employees and clients with professional
1998]
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workplaces which tolerate anti-female behavior; '"67 and third,
because it can be used to support "a merely juvenile behavior
defense."68 The Ellison court's reasonable woman standard has
been criticized by both feminists and conservatives. Feminists are
wary because the reasonable woman standard replaces one stere-
otypic notion of reasonableness (a man's) with another (a
woman's) and thus "replace [s] one caricature with another. '69 It
is also felt that the reasonable woman standard subverts the pur-
pose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by perpetuating rather than
eliminating sexual stereotypes.70 A more conservative view holds
that any departures from the reasonable man standard should be
legislatively mandated, given the long tradition in which "Anglo-
American jurisprudence has utilized the reasonable person stan-
dard and its predecessor, the reasonable man standard. '71 Robin-
son has been criticized because the scope of the injunction,
which prohibits not only pictures in public places at the shipyard
but also the private reading of some magazines on the workers'
lunchtimes and breaks," infringes on the workers' First Amend-
ment rights. The isolated workplace slur or innuendo, which
would not be actionable under current hostile environment law,
will be suppressed by employers fearful of liability: "employ-
ers... cannot restrict speech that creates a hostile work environ-
ment without suppressing other speech as well."73 This virtual
shutdown of workplace opinion, many feel, is too high a price to
pay, and some go so far as to argue that any regulation of speech
in the workplace violates the First Amendment.
74
Each opinion, too, has its positive aspects. The dueling
majority opinion and dissent in Rabidue, as Nancy Ehrenreich has
dignity and without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse.") (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
67. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,
J., dissenting).
68. Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1857,
1858 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 1993).
69. Finley, supra note 16, at 63.
70. See Claire Saady, Editorial, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1993, at 13.
71. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Mich. 1993).
72. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1542
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
73. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA.
L. REv. 1791, 1859 (1992).
74. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor
Sangree, 47 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 579 (1995). First Amendment concerns were
briefed in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), but were not dealt
with in the Court's opinion. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Architecture of the First
Amendment and the Case of Workplace Harassment, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1364,
1366 (1997).
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so clearly articulated, lay bare the myth of pluralism that holds
that we can support all groups, no matter how competing their
claims: "the notion that pluralism is an unproblematic goal is log-
ically incoherent and disconsonant with the reality of irresolvable
conflicts between groups."7 In this way, Rabidue makes us face
the unsettling fact that we have to choose between Douglas
Henry's workplace and Vivienne Rabidue's; the possibility of
compromise, of a solution that makes everyone if not happy, sat-
isfied, is an illusion. The Ellison court displays uncommon sensi-
tivity to the day-to-day realities of women's lives, in which the
threat of sexual violence is omnipresent. And the Robinson court,
with its nearly tedious delineation of the remarks, conduct, and
pornography present at Jacksonville Shipyards, presents us with a
workplace reality that few of us will ever experience.
Nonetheless, all this reality does not seem to have moved us
closer to an acceptable point of view; it has not answered
"according to whom?" Each court is faced with choosing one
perspective and rejecting another, and the champions of the
rejected perspective have cogent arguments. Moreover, the
nexus between sex discrimination and sexual harassment is
becoming increasingly blurred, especially concerning the diffuse
and undefined conduct that becomes the focus of many hostile
environment claims. Why this conduct amounts to sex discrimi-
nation is, as Katherine Franke argues, undertheorized.76 Courts,
including the Supreme Court, have asserted rather than analyzed
that sexual harassment is sex discrimination and is thus prohib-
ited by Title VII. This failure to set up an adequate analytical
framework has led us to an impasse in which almost anything or
nothing might qualify as sexual harassment.
When an issue is as emotionally charged as sexual harass-
ment, any ruling will be controversial, of course. Still, it is help-
ful to explore ways of understanding the workplace experience
so that the link between harassment and discrimination remains
clear and so that the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII
are not perceived to be utilized as a device unnecessarily to
silence people or to police social mores. The Robinson court
takes into account the nature of the space in which the conduct
occurs and demonstrates an increasing awareness that perspec-
tive and space are interrelated. This promising development
75. Ehrenreich, supra note 14, at 1221.
76. See Franke, supra note 12, at 691-92. Franke argues that "the Supreme
Court has provided lower courts with ample description of the what of sexual
harassment, without ever providing a sufficient account of why sexual
harassment is actionable under laws prohibiting discrimination because of sex."
Id. at 692.
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may be furthered by an understanding of the gendering of space
and how gendered space and discrimination go hand in hand.
The concept of gendered space, I believe, offers a new lens
through which to view the workplace and thereby to determine
what behavior is merely boorish and what is discriminatory. It
also provides a way of understanding the nature of the workplace
so that a court's choices do not appear to be so one-sided.
GENDERED SPACES
"Gendered spaces" is a concept put forth by Daphne Spain
in her 1992 book.7 Drawing on anthropology, architecture, soci-
ology, and geography, Spain studied the relationship between
space and status in various cultures, places, and social structures,
such as the family, education, and the workplace. After discover-
ing that woman's status is lowest in societies in which housing is
sexually segregated, she formulated the concept of "spatial insti-
tutions" and matched "the social institutions of the family, educa-
tion, and the labor force with their respective spatial corollaries
of the dwelling, the school, and the workplace."7 8
Spain demonstrates that much space has been and is
gendered: that is, it is purposely made and kept specifically for
women or for men. Dwelling places, for example, from the
Mongolian ger and the Turkish yurt in nonindustrial societies79 to
the lady's drawing room and the men's smoking room in nine-
teenth century English country houses,8" reflect rigid gender seg-
regation that reinforces social and status differences both inside
and outside the home.
As these status differences began to break down in the twen-
tieth century when more and more women entered the labor
force, contemporary house floor plans likewise changed. Draw-
ing rooms and smoking rooms gave way to great rooms in which
the entire family gathered; closed female-gendered kitchens lost
their confining walls and often opened on to the great room.81
Like houses, educational institutions were long character-
ized by the spatial segregation of women and men. 'Just as cere-
monial huts were places in which men shared knowledge and
excluded women in nonindustrial societies, American schools
historically were masculine places of learning that excluded
77. DAPHNE SPAIN, GENDERED SPACES (1992).
78. Id. at xiv.
79. See id. at 37-52.
80. See id. at 112-15.
81. See id. at 129-34.
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women."82 Space, Spain postulates, is related to acquisition of
knowledge, and that women have traditionally been kept out of
spaces in which they could acquire enough knowledge and
hence power to change their status in society: "'spatial institu-
tions' form barriers to women's acquisition of knowledge by
assigning women and men to different gendered spaces. Mascu-
line spaces (such as nineteenth-century American colleges) con-
tained socially valued knowledge of theology, law, and medicine,
while feminine spaces (such as the home) contain devalued
knowledge of child care, cooking, and cleaning." 3
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that
homes and schools began to eliminate gender segregation, and
"[t]he demise of separate spheres for women and men was has-
tened by the gender integration of education, which in turn con-
tributed to gender integration of the labor force." 4 This gender
integration in the workplace, however, has been more difficult to
achieve. There was and remains much at stake in the gender
integration of the workplace. Men's jobs pay more money and
women working with men can make more money, and become
more economically independent, than can women mired in
women's jobs. Women can also acquire knowledge and skills
that make them competitive in male workplaces. They can, in
short, take jobs that pay well and that provide them with skills for
advancement, jobs that hitherto were guaranteed for men.
The effort to keep women out of the male workplace occurs
in two ways: first, law can be enlisted so that women are not
allowed into male jobs. Historically, courts buttressed the sepa-
rate sphere structure of society and women were legally relegated
to the private domestic sphere, where they had little access to
money or knowledge. Women's entry into the public sphere was
fought every step of the way, often with the complicity of the
courts: women were too "timid and delicate" for a profession
such as law;85 women were too physically frail to compete on an
equal footing with men for jobs; 6 women were too morally vul-
nerable to work as barmaids without special protection; 7 women
with small children should not hold jobs;88 women are too inher-
82. Id. at 143.
83. Id. at 10-11.
84. Id. at 168.
85. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
86. SeeJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 130 (1908).
87. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
88. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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ently objects of male predatory behavior to be prison guards; 9
women, as potential childbearers, should not work around possi-
bly dangerous substances.9" Finally, many of these legal obstacles
to women becoming unencumbered members of the workforce
fell, and Congress reinforced the change by passing the Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act that prohibited sex discrimination in
employment.91
The second method, which gathers strength if the laws
change and women are legally permitted into male work spaces,
is a patriarchal version of moral suasion: women must be per-
suaded that they do not belong in the male workplace. Male
control over knowledge and money is, thereby, maintained. If
women can be made to feel morally vulnerable or unfit for male
workplaces, then all of the legal guarantees of equal pay and
equal access become fruitless. Before major legal changes such
as Title VII, as women slowly began to enter the workforce in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one of the primary
non-legal objections raised to women in men's jobs was the
threat to morality. "As long as women were engaged in house-
hold production, teaching or domestic service, they were per-
ceived as morally protected,"92 in that, they were in contact with
relatives and children. Women in the male workplace were
vulnerable.
Spain suggests, however, that the threat to morals may be
seen as a red herring, that the fear of women entering the
workforce had its roots more in economics than morals. Even in
the nineteenth century, when women and men working together
was described as "detrimental to morality,"93 economic loss may
well have been the real threat to men. Spain writes:
When women entered the public (i.e., male) sphere,
they ran the risk of being stigmatized as morally suspect-
whether in the factory or in the office. Such informal
mechanisms of control served to discourage women from
pushing into a predominantly male labor force. Expres-
sing fears of loose morals may have been more socially
89. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
90. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991).
91. Of course, discrimination on the basis of sex was not taken very
seriously at first, both by lawmakers and the courts. As the now famous story
relates, the word "sex" became part of Title VII because of Representative
Howard Smith's misfired effort to scuttle the entire bill. See 110 CONG. REC.
2577-84 (1964).
92. SPAIN, supra note 77, at 196.
93. Id. at 195.
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acceptable than expressing fears of economic competition.
The sexual integration of the workplace was clearly per-
ceived as a threat when it first occurred, but the threat was
defined on moral grounds rather than economic grounds
which seem, in retrospect, to be the more realistic fear.
9 4
Preserving spatial segregation is crucial to the maintenance
of power, in that the dominant group can control access to
knowledge if it controls the places in which others might get this
power. But this second method, informal mechanisms of control
that lack the force of law, requires the complicity of women.
"The powerful cannot maintain their positions without the coop-
eration of the less powerful. If a given stratification is to persist,
then, both powerful and less-powerful groups must be engaged
in its constant renegotiation and re-creation."9 5 In other words,
if men can convince women that they do not belong in male
workplaces and women "voluntarily" stay out of these workplaces,
the economic threat inherent in the gender integration of the
workplace dissipates.
The dominant group must, therefore, control constructions
of reality so that subordinate groups accept the status quo and
their place in it, even if that place is rigidly circumscribed. Such
a "renegotiation and re-creation" occurs in places like the Osce-
ola Refining Company and Jacksonville Shipyards, and a sexually-
charged atmosphere that women find uncomfortable is a means
by which the men who work there can control the construction
of reality. Women are uncomfortable in such places and feel
that they don't belong there, that these workplaces are "boys'
clubs." As long as it is "unreasonable" to experience discomfort
in such a place, the law offers no redress and the status quo, the
male workplace, is maintained. On the other hand, if courts sup-
port the reasonableness of some workers' response by putting
women in a special category that may include traits such as
hypersensitivity, delicacy, and vulnerability, then we risk perpetu-
ating damaging (and untrue) stereotypes. This is the current
construction of reality, that we are forced into a Hobson's choice
between not protecting women in the workplace or accepting
sexual stereotypes. And it is just this fallacy that the concept of
gendered space can deconstruct.
94. Id. at 196.
95. Id. at 17.
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GENDERED SPACE AND THE REASONABLE PERSON
Let us return now to the problem of perspective and imag-
ine courts taking into account the gendered nature of a work-
place. In a workplace that is gendered female-a nursing station
in a hospital, for example-a male nurse will experience himself
as hyper-gendered. While the female nurses in this space are
largely oblivious to the fact that they are female nurses, he is con-
stantly aware that he is a male nurse. He will thus experience
derogatory comments about men, comments about male sexual-
ity, and comments about his own sexuality in a more sensitive way
than he would in a space that is male gendered or neutral. In
the nursing space, these comments are not merely annoying or
even insulting, but they also remind him that he is male, that he
is an outsider, and that he is not suited for this work. For these
remarks to hinder his doing well on the job is a reasonable
response, even though it might not be a reasonable response in a
male gendered workspace where his hypersensitivity is not to be
expected.
Imagine, too, that the nurses, on some level, fear the entry
of men into the nursing profession because it will result in more
applicants for a finite number ofjobs, reduce job availability, and
perhaps even drive down wages. As they come to realize that
their behavior makes their male coworker uncomfortable, their
behavior becomes the means by which they can guarantee that
few men thrive in the nursing profession.96
Likewise, and obviously more to my point, if we utilize the
lens of gendered space, we need not rely on the politically-
charged reasonable woman or man standard. My male nurse is a
reasonable male worker in work space that is gendered female.
Remarks and behavior that in any way emphasize his maleness
are inevitably linked to suggestions that he does not belong in
this space.97 What he is like in male gendered space is irrelevant
just as Vivienne Rabidue's personal qualities become irrelevant if
the gendered space of Osceola Refining Company is taken into
account. The concept of gendered space can cut through the
myth. of neutrality that so clouded the court's judgment in
96. Ever since the development of hostile environment as a claim,
commentators have remarked upon its relationship to power in the workplace
and its use as a tool to keep women economically suppressed. See MACKINNON,
supra note 17, at 174-77; Franke, supra note 12, at 693-95; Abrams, supra note
12, at 1202.
97. See Abrams, supra note 12, at 1208. She writes: "Sexual inquiries,
jokes, remarks, or innuendoes sometimes can raise the spectre of coercion, but
they more predictably have the effect of reminding a woman that she is viewed
as an object of sexual derision rather than a credible coworker." Id.
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Rabidue. It also avoids the dilemma central to the court's posi-
tion in Ellison that women and men are somehow essentially dif-
ferent in their responses to sexually-loaded remarks and
behavior.98 In fact, women and men may be remarkably similar.
The problem, of course, is that female-gendered workplaces with
few or sole male workers are rare, whereas the reverse is quite
common. On mere numbers, then, there seem to be more sensi-
tive women, or women seem to be more sensitive. Yet through
the lens of gendered space, it becomes clearer that anyone,
regardless of gender, struggling to fit into a workplace that is
gendered other may well respond with heightened sensitivity to
subtle reminders, in the form of sex-laden remarks and conduct,
that one is an outsider. I finally disagree, then, that sexual har-
assment is a "distinctly different experience for women than it is
for men."99 It just seems that way because of the ubiquitous
maleness of most workplaces. In other words, sensitivity has to
do with the nature of the workplace, not the nature of the
person.
Sexual harassment in gendered space, then, is sex discrimi-
nation because it operates to maintain the sexual stratification of
the workplace and to keep women from knowledge and money.
Franke puts this connection between harassment and discrimina-
tion powerfully and graphically: "sexual harassment is sexually
discriminatory wrong because of the gender norms it reflects and
perpetuates.... Sexual harassment is a technology of sexism. 1 °°
As the incidence of offensive conduct in a hostile environment
increases, the workplace finally becomes intolerable to the
minority gender and the gendered nature of the workplace
remains unchanged. Increased access to male gendered work-
places, then, cannot alone eliminate gender stratification in
employment. Sexual harassment is a technology, I would main-
tain, that takes its force from the gendered nature of the work-
place. In other words, it works not because of its overt content,
but because of its subtext, its "hidden" message that the female
worker does not belong in the male workplace. The message
may be "dumb ass woman" or "come sit on my face," but its con-
tent is secondary to its effect. In a neutral workplace, these
remarks have less power, are less likely to force a worker out of
98. I do not want to throw out the baby with the bathwater here and
underplay the welcome insightfulness of the court in recognizing that women,
in a culture rampant with both real and imaged violence against women,
interpret sexual advances as more threatening than do men. Women's
response, however, is not more sensitive, but more realistic.
99. Abrams, supra note 12, at 1202.
100. Franke, supra note 12, at 693.
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the workplace, and thus may not be discrimination. Therefore,
whether it is legally redressable should depend on the gendered
nature of the place in which it occurs. And the extent of the
law's involvement and the legal remedies, from sweeping injunc-
tions to less draconian measures, depends on the gendered
nature of the workplace.
The idea of a static reasonable person-man or woman-is
unnecessary and finally untrue to the employment experience.
Perspective-reasonableness-depends. When weighing the total-
ity of the workplace to determine whether conduct reaches an
impermissible level, courts must take into account the gendered
nature of the workplace itself. As more and more women are
initially protected by the law (in decisions such as Robinson) and
are able not only to enter but also to survive and reach their full
potential in places such as shipyards and refining plants, the
necessity of legal protection lessens. Sexual stratification of the
workplace diminishes, sexual harassment will have failed as a
technology to maintain the stratification, and the promise of
equality will have moved closer to realization.
